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Juvenile Judge, Power to Grant Immunity
In Commonwealth v. Russ R., 433 Mass. 515 (2001), the Court held
that: 1. juvenile court judges are not authorized to grant immunity
to witnesses appearing in proceedings before the juvenile court;
and, 2. no court is empowered to grant immunity to a witness testifying
in a proceeding in the juvenile court. In Russ R., as in Connor
C, supra, and Valiton, supra, the Court applied well established
rules of statutory construction to determine the intent of the
legislature. The three cases together are a good primer on the
law of statutory construction.
G.L. c. 233 § 20E, (subject to conditions not relevant to
this discussion), authorizes judges of the Supreme Judicial Court,
the Appeals Court and the Superior Court to grant immunity to
witnesses who are testifying in proceedings before the grand jury
or one of the three named courts. Section 56 of c. 119 provides
that judges presiding over jury sessions in the juvenile court,
"shall have and exercise all the powers and duties which
a justice sitting in the superior court department has and may
exercise in the trial and disposition of criminal cases."
Relying on c. 119 § 56, the Commonwealth sought a grant of
immunity for a witness who was to testify in a youthful offender
prosecution pending in a District Court, Juvenile Session. The
District Court judge denied the request for immunity and the Commonwealth
appealed. Although the appeal arose out of a district court proceeding,
the holding and reasoning are fully applicable to proceedings
in the juvenile court. 433 Mass. at 517, n.3.
The Court acknowledged that the statutes could be construed in
"two conflicting ways." 433 Mass. at 520. The legislature
is "presumed to be aware of existing statutes when it amends
statute or enacts a new one." Id, (citation omitted). Thus,
the legislature was presumed to be aware of the provisions of
c. 119 § 56 granting Juvenile Court judges the authority
of Superior Court judges in the trial of delinquency cases when
it amended c. 233 § 20E to allow Superior Court judges to
immunize witnesses in criminal cases. "If the Legislature
were aware that § 56(d) gave the Juvenile Court the same
powers, there was no need to refer specifically to the Juvenile
Court in the immunity statute." Id.
Other rules of statutory construction however, led to a different
conclusion. First, chapter 233 § 20E had historically allowed
only a justice of the SJC to grant immunity to witnesses. In 1998
(two years after c. 119 § 56 was last amended) § 20E
was amended to significantly broaden the procedures for granting
witnesses immunity and to expressly give this power to Appeals
Court and Superior Court judges. The Court considered the omission
of Juvenile Court judges from the 1998 amendment to be purposeful.
433 Mass. at 522. Moreover, § 20E was considered to be a
clear and "unambiguous statute," as well as a "specific
statute" to which the more general c. 119 § 56 must
yield. 433 Mass. at 520 - 521. The Court also considered that
if the legislature intended to authorize the juvenile court to
grant immunity, it could "easily have included the Juvenile
Court in the statute[.]" 433 Mass. at 522.
Finally, the Court noted that the plain language of § 20E
authorized grants of immunity only to a witness in a criminal
proceeding in the Supreme Judicial Court, Appeals Court or Superior
Court. Id. Because the statute does not authorize grants of immunity
to witnesses appearing in the juvenile court, the SJC reasoned
that the legislature did not intend to authorize the juvenile
court judges to grant witnesses immunity. Id. The Court recognized
that this holding could make it more difficult to deal with juveniles
accused of violent crimes, and recommended a legislative solution.
433 Mass. at 523. See also, 433 Mass. at 524, (Ireland, J. concurring)
and 433 Mass. at 524 (Greaney, J. dissenting).
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Mistake of Fact; Not a Defense To Rape
In Commonwealth v. Lopez, 433 Mass. 722 (2001), the SJC rejected
a defendant's argument that an "honest and reasonable belief
as to a complainant's consent" is a defense to the crime
of rape. 433 Mass. at 722. Because rape, as defined in Massachusetts,
is a general intent crime the defendant need not have a specific
intent to engage in intercourse without the victim's consent.
433 Mass. at 728. "Although the Commonwealth must prove lack
of consent, the 'elements for rape do not require that the defendant
intend the intercourse be without consent.'" 433 Mass. at
727, quoting, Commonwealth v. Grant, 391 Mass. 645, 650 (1984).
The relevant inquiry is, "limited to consent in fact, and
no mens rea or knowledge as to the lack of consent has ever been
required." Id. Proof that the defendant "intended sexual
intercourse by force [or threat of force] coupled with proof that
the victim did not in fact consent is sufficient to maintain a
conviction." 433 Mass. at 728. In rejecting a defense based
on the defendant's intent, the Court expressed concern that such
a defense would "tend to eviscerate the long-standing rule
in this Commonwealth that victims need not use any force to resist
an attack. [Citations omitted.] A shift in focus from the victim's
to the defendant's state of mind might require victims to use
physical force in order to communicate an unqualified lack of
consent to defeat aby honest and reasonable belief as to consent."
433 Mass. at 729. This, the Court reasoned would be inconsistent
with the evolution of the law in the Commonwealth. Id.
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