Crowe v. County of San
Diego, 303 Supp.2d 1050, S.D. Cal., (2004)
Suit for Malicious Prosecution of
Juveniles Whose Case Was Dismissed.
In 1998 three juveniles, Michael Crowe, Aaron Houser and Michael Treadway, were arrested and indicted for the murder of Stephanie Crowe (Michael Crowe’s sister). In 1999 the murder charges against the three juveniles were dismissed. After the dismissal of the charges the boys and their families subsequently filed 3 separate complaints in state court alleging violations of 42 U.S.C §1983 and various state law torts against county, prosecutor, and law enforcement personnel. On the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the District Court, held that: Police officers were entitled to qualified immunity from claim they engaged in illegal search of suspect's residence; Officers could not be held liable under § 1983 for coercing confessions in violation of Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination, where compelled statements were not used against the suspects in a criminal trial; and Prosecutor's statements during television interview regarding case were not defamatory per se under California defamation statute.
Office of the
Child Advocate v. Lindgren, 296 F.Supp.2d 178, D.R.I., (2004)
United States District Court, D. Rhode Island- January 8, 2004
Lawsuit commenced in 1988 when Office of the Child Advocate (“OCA”,)
under the leadership of NEJDC Board Member Laureen D’Ambra,
sued Rhode Island’s Department of Children, Youth and Families
(“DCYF”), alleging violations of children’s
rights under the US Constitution and the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 198...
Ramos v. Town of Vernon,
2003 WL 21257959 (2nd Circuit Conn.)
In a 2 to 1 decision, Chief Judge Cardamone of the U.S Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, ruled that a juvenile curfew
violated the U.S. Constitution's equal protection clause.
Commonwealth v. Cheney, 800 N.E. 2d 309,
Mass. (2003)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex - December
15, (2003)
Article 30 of the Declaration of Rights of the MA Constitution
does not permit a judge, prior to verdict, finding or plea, to
dismiss a legally adequate criminal indictment in the “interests
of public justice” over the Commonwealth’s objection.
Held, Superior Court erred in placing juvenile, indicted on four
charges of rape of a child under the age of sixteen, on pre-trial
probation and continuing case without a change of plea or an admission
to specific facts as per juvenile’s motion under M.G.L.
Ch. 276, Sec. 87.
Commonwealth v. Ben B., a juvenile, 796 N.E.2d 432,
Mass.App.Ct., (2003)
Appeals Court of Massachusetts- September 26, 2003
Juvenile accompanied sister, sister’s friend and sister’s
three children on a shopping errand in downtown Boston. Sister’s
friend is carrying loaded gun in his waist band. When it began
to slip down inside his pant leg, he let the gun slide into the
stroller in which sister’s one year old child was sitting.
Sister remarks that it is not a good idea for the gun to be in
the stroller; juvenile picks it up and places it in his pocket.
Inside department store, juvenile is caught shoplifting; a pat
and frisk search reveals the gun. Juvenile charged with unlawful
possession of a firearm asserts defense of necessity. An integral
element to this defense requires that there be imminent danger
posed to either the defendant or, as here, a third person (one-year
old in stroller.)
Appeals court affirmed juvenile court judge decision to instruct
jury in this defense. Held, incomplete evidence of imminent danger
and even with such evidence, juvenile was not entitled to walk
around the department store with the gun on his person for a 15
minute time period.
Commonwealth v. Lawrence L., 792 N.E.2d 109,
Mass. (2003)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex- July 23, 2003
When acting pursuant to a memorandum of understanding between
a school and police department stating guidelines for reporting
students’ criminal behavior, a vice principal is not an
agent of the police. In this case, the vice principal’s
decision to question and search the youth who smelled of marijuana,
was in compliance with existing school search decisions and did
not violate the juvenile’s Federal and State constitutional
rights when the results of the search were reported to the police.
Commonwealth v. Ira I., 791 N.E2d 894, Mass. (2003)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden- July 23,
2003
Vice principal was acting within scope of his employment and
not as agent of the police when he questioned juveniles regarding
an assault on a fellow student. Vice principal was not required
to give Miranda warnings prior to obtaining juveniles’ statements
because the juveniles were not in custody and their statements
were voluntary.
Commonwealth v. Lucret, 797 N.E.2d 379, Mass. (2003)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts- October 3, 2003
The youthful offender statute (M.G.L. c. 119, §58 (b))
allows judges the discretion to either sentence concurrently or
consecutively so long as the combination sentence does not exceed
the maximum adult sentence. The decision clarified any ambiguity
in the statute regarding whether a youth sentence and adult sentence
were to be served concurrently or consecutively after a probation
violation.
Commonwealth v. Alfonso
A.
438 Mass. 372 (2003)
Juvenile arrested and charges with possession of
a firearm based on his presence at an apartment where Boston police
officers seized several firearms pursuant to the execution of
a search warrant. Appeals court held that the juvenile was not
provided with a 'genuine opportunity' to consult with an interested
adult before making statements at the scene. SJC affirmed, holding
that an adult, who is sufficiently interested in the juvenile's
welfare, must be immediately and evidently available to the juvenile
in order for there to be a genuine opportunity for consultation.
Commonwealth v. Mark M.
59 Mass. App. Ct. 86 (2003)
Juvenile investigated on charge of sexual assault.
At a meeting with a Detective, juvenile and legal guardian received
oral and written Miranda warnings. Prior to initial interview,
juvenile did not consult with guardian, but rather, with her consent,
agreed to speak with Detective in guardian's presence. Juvenile
made incriminating statements to Detective in initial and a second,
private meeting. Appeals Court held that it was improper for initial
interview to commence without allowing the juvenile an opportunity
to consult with his guardian; also held that trial court's findings
lacked evidence as to whether statements made in second interview
were sufficiently insulated from initial interview's illegality.
Furthermore, court held there are no cases requiring the police
to inform juvenile of his right to consult; rather, in order for
there to be an actual opportunity to consult, the interested adult
must understand that there is an opportunity and what his role
is in respect to that consultation.
Commonwealth v. Clark C.
59 Mass. App. Ct. 542 (2003)
Police Lieutenant spoke to juvenile's grandmother
at her home regarding juvenile's participation in a home invasion
(juvenile was not present). Several days later, juvenile phoned
lieutenant; after some initial confusion, lieutenant informed
juvenile that he had been at his home and spoken to his grandmother.
Juvenile made incriminating statement and asked lieutenant if
he should confess. Juvenile said he would come in to the station
or call the following day. Juvenile failed to contact lieutenant;
lieutenant went to juvenile's home with an arrest warrant obtained
some days earlier. Lieutenant was admitted to home, and directed
to juvenile's bedroom, where he was sleeping. Upon being awoken
by Lieutenant, juvenile asked if his grandmother had turned him
in and, when asked why he hadn't turned himself in, told Lieutenant
that he was afraid. Appeals Court held that only the last two
statements should be suppressed, finding that Miranda was inapplicable
to initial statements because juvenile was not 'in custody,' but
last statement by juvenile was a result of the functional equivalent
of interrogation.
Commonwealth v. Lamont L.
438 Mass. 842 (2003)
SJC held that when a juvenile is adjudicated a youthful
offender on a misdemeanor, the appropriate remedy is for a delinquency
finding to enter, rather than for the court to dismiss the indictment.
Although juvenile here should not have been indicted on the misdemeanor
in the first place; however, because the indictment properly stated
an offense and the juvenile had full notice of the offense against
him, the inclusion of an additional, improperly brought indictment
did not prejudice him.
Commonwealth v. Furr
58 Mass. App. Ct. 155 (2003)
Juvenile adjudicated youthful offender on charges
of unlawful possession of a firearm, receiving a firearm with
an altered serial number, attempted intimidation of a witness
and obstruction of justice in 2000. Juvenile had previous youthful
offender adjudications on charges of armed carjacking, kidnapping
and assault and battery. On 2000 indictments, Commonwealth sought
imposition of enhanced penalties available where defendant has
previous adjudication of a violent crime or serious drug offense
as defined in M.G.L. c 269, s 10G. Appeals court found that prior
adjudication as a youthful offender alone is basis for invoking
enhanced penalties provision, interpreting language in s 10G,
when read in conjunction with M.G.L. c. 140, s. 121 (defining
violent crime as acts of juvenile delinquency involving the use
or possession of a deadly weapon that would be punishable by imprisonment
for a term of one year if committed by an adult,) to consider
adjudication as a youthful offender a conviction.
Commonwealth v. Olaf O.
57 Mass. App. Ct. 918 (2003)
Juvenile adjudicated delinquent of one count of
statutory rape and two counts of indecent assault and battery.
On appeal, juvenile argued that he was entitled to a jury of 12
because he faced the possibility of 'infamous punishment' because
the adjudication will cause his name to be listed on the sex offender
registry. Appeals Court held prosecution did not involve risk
on infamous punishment because it was tried as a juvenile case
with no greater outcome than commitment to Department of Youth
Services until the age of 18.
Lavallee, et al. v Justices in the Hampden
Superior Court, et al. - August 2004
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